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Decision-making, Behavioural modeling, Automated vehicles. 
This work presents a consideration of the applicability of risky decision-making theory models as a tool to understand 
drivers’ take-over behaviour from vehicle automation, while also incorporating the “Out of the Loop” concept and the 
process of Situation Awareness Recovery. A methodological discussion is provided, and implications for the processes 
involved in system design developments are presented. Finally, the paper concludes that the process of evidence 
accumulation in risky decision-making theory models has strong parallels with the process of Situation Awareness 
recovery. We argue that evidence accumulation models can be used as a tool to understand what information is used by 
drivers for achieving safe transitions of control from automation so that this knowledge can be used for a better, and 
more human-centred design of future in-vehicle interfaces. In the end, this paper presents one theoretical model as a 
practical implementation of the theory discussed in experimental datasets. 
 
Tomada de decisão, Modelagem comportamental, Automação veicular. 
Este trabalho apresenta uma apreciação teórica da aplicabilidade de modelos de tomada de decisão de risco como uma 
ferramenta para entender o comportamento de motoristas durante retomadas de controle de um veículo automatizado. O 
artigo se foca na relação entre o conceito de “Out of the Loop” e consciência da situação. Uma discussão metodológica 
é feita, e suas implicaçóes para o design de produtos é apresentada. Ao fim da discussão, este artigo conclui que o 
processo de acumulação de evidência em modelos de tomada de decisão possui paralelos fortes com o conceito de 
retomada de consciência da situação. Dito isto, modelos de acumulação de evidência podem ser tuilizados como 
ferramentas para entender como motoristas usam a informação para tomar decisões seguras, e esta informação pode ser 
reforçada no design de interfaces embarcadas. Ao fim do artigo, um modelo conceitual é apresentado como sugestão 
para aplicação prática da teoria proposta em dados experimentais. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Among the human factors-related challenges of 
implementing vehicle automation, is ensuring safe 
responses from users during transitions of control. 
Recent research into this issue forms part of a larger 
body of research regarding the better design of 
human-machine interfaces, spanning multiple 
domains and decades. These challenges highlight an 
old irony of automation, where the more reliable the 
automation, the less prepared the human is to react 
in a time of need (Bainbridge, 1985). This is 
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especially true for higher levels of vehicle 
automation, which do not require continuous 
monitoring of the driving task, but still rely on users 
to resume control, for example, when a system 
limitation is reached (Level 3. See SAE, 2018 for a 
complete description of the levels of vehicular 
automation). 
 
Many recent driving simulator studies, for example, 
those described by Louw & Merat (2017), have 
identified that drivers in higher levels of vehicle 
automation (SAE L2+) are removed from the 
decision-making and control loops of the driving 
task, placing them “out of the loop” (see Merat et al. 
(2018) for a recent description of the term). This 
disengagement from the loops is thought to reduce 
drivers’ capacity to react in dangerous situations, 
increasing the likelihood of collisions.  
 
Many researchers have tried to understand what 
constitutes a safe transition of control from 
automation, investigating what factors influence the 
success of a transition. For example, Gold et al. 
(2013) demonstrated that drivers’ response to an 
impending collision, following a request for a 
transition of control, is dependent on the amount of 
time given to drivers for this response. These 
authors report that when drivers were given less 
time to react, they reacted faster, but more 
erratically, as shown by the vehicle’s lateral and 
longitudinal accelerations. In contrast, when given 
more time to respond to an impending collision, 
drivers reacted more slowly but had a more stable 
response profile.  
 
Zeeb at al. (2015, 2016) have shown that drivers’ 
take-over time and the quality of this take over 
(measured as vehicle lateral deviation), is linked to 
their attention to the road environment during 
automated driving, with higher levels of distraction 
to other, non-driving-related tasks, leading to a 
deterioration of take-over quality. However, Louw 
et al. (2018) suggest that take-over time and vehicle 
controllability alone are not good predictors of a 
safe transition of control, but rather the early 
mitigation of a threat, with earlier transitions of 
control leading to fewer collisions. 
 
A common limitation of studies attempting to 
correlate drivers’ visual attention with their 
performance on non-driving-related tasks during 
automation, is that most investigate the location of 
drivers’ gaze, rather than attempting to understand 
how visual information, acquired from different 
sources during automation engagement, affects 
drivers’ resumption of control. While there have 
been efforts to model the factors that influence 
drivers’ capabilities to take-over control, and how 
they use the physical and mental resources they 
need to perform such an action, most have not 
managed to generate a predictive model, based on 
gaze patterns during take-overs (Happee et al., 
2018). For example, in Victor et al. (2018), while 
have reported that some drivers, even though 
looking to the road centre, still failed to avoid 
crashes during a transition of control (similar to 
results also reported by Louw et al., 2017).  
 
Studies in other domains have considered how 
visual information sampling affects decision making 
in humans (see Orquin & Loose, 2013 for a 
complete literature review of these studies). For 
instance, Fiedler & Glöckner (2012), identified that 
gamblers shift their gaze towards the gamble they 
are willing to make, before their decision, and used 
this information as a predictor of their choice 
selection.  
 
This paper proposes that the application of decision 
making theories, and related models, can be used to 
address some of the gaps in research on user 
resumption of control from vehicle automation, by 
providing a quantifiable method of linking the 
acquisition of specific information from the 
environment to the probability of a particular 
response (Orquin & Loose, 2013). Currently, there 
are only a few studies that highlight the possibility 
of such a link (c.f. Markkula et al., 2018). In this 
work, we consider how theoretical models for risky 
decision-making can be used to study drivers’ 
transition of control in automation by observing 
their visual sampling behaviour during different 
stages of the take over process.  
 
We begin with outlining the two theoretical bases of 
this work: decision-making theory, and the human 
factors of transitions of control. Thereafter, the two 
theories will be compared, especially regarding their 
analogous processes of Situation Awareness 
acquisition and evidence accumulation. Finally, this 
paper considers how such an approach can generate 
outputs that may be applied by presenting a 
conceptual mathematical model that can be used to 
fit experimental data regarding transitions of control 
to understand human behaviour. 
 
2. Transitions of control from vehicle 
automation 
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This section of the paper aims to define key 
concepts in the field of human factors of transitions 
of control, such as the decision-action loop, 
Situation Awareness, and the issues that are related 
to this process. With a clear definition of this 
concept in hand, it will be possible to compare them 
to the concepts related to the decision-making 
theory, understanding how they might interact and 
complement each other. 
 
The term transition of control was described by 
Louw (2017) as: “the process and period of 
transferring responsibility of, and control over, some 
or all aspects of a driving task, between a human 
driver and an automated driving system.” SAE 
(2018) complement this definition with a taxonomy, 
by outlining how a driver’s responsibility varies 
across the different levels of automation, and a 
distinction if they were system- or driver-initiated 
transitions. The need for such transitions of control 
is partly based on current system limitations, in 
terms of the technology’s operational design domain 
(see NHTSA, 2016, for a more descriptive 
definition of the problem), where vehicles cannot 
operate in all scenarios, and the human drivers are 
expected to supervise the automation and resume 
control, whenever a system limitation is reached. 
However, the inherent problem with such 
supervisory roles is diminished driving capabilities 
associated with the relinquishing of control, which 
his associated with several challenges when drivers 
are requested to resume control, especially in time-
critical scenarios (Louw, 2017). Some of these 
issues are discussed below. 
2.1. The decision-dction loop 
According to many authors (e.g. Young, 2012), 
manual driving is a task which requires the driver to 
always be in the information processing “loop”, 
with regards to their interactions with the 
surrounding road environment, as well as their 
ability to control and coordinate vehicle 
manoeuvres, involving steering, acceleration and 
braking. Thomas (2001) states that the operation of 
a vehicle is closely associated with constant 
feedback and feed-forward cycle of human 
interaction with the task. Here, humans’ decisions 
and actions affect the situation, and this change is 
perceived once more by the individuals, who orient 
and adjust their behaviour accordingly. Merat et al. 
(2018) further complement this logic for the context 
of vehicle automation (based on the model purposed 
by Michon, 1985), by stating that there are two 
distinct loops in manual driving, which can be 
affected by ceding control to automation: one for 
motor-control coordination, and another for the 
several decision-making processes that need to be 
performed while driving. They suggest “(…) that 
“being in the loop” can be understood in terms of 
(1) the driver’s physical control of the vehicle, and 
(2) monitoring the current driving situation (…)” 
(Merat et al., 2018). It must be noted that both loops 
continually interact with each other, and drivers 
must be aware of both their visual-motor 
coordination (see Wilkie et al., 2008 for a more 
descriptive definition of the term) and the 
surrounding environment, to safely maintain control 
of the task
Figure 1. Representation of the decision-action loop and drivers’ monitoring role in manual control of the driving task 
(Merat et al., 2019; based on Michon’s model, 1985; Copyright © 2019 Springer. Reprinted with Permission of 
Springer Publications).
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2.2. Situation awareness recovery 
 
Using driving simulator experiments, Louw et al. 
(2016), supplemented by previous evidence from 
Damböck et al. (2013), argue that by removing 
drivers from the decision-making and control loops, 
vehicle automation reduces drivers’ Situation 
Awareness (SA; Endsley, 1995), which needs to be 
re-acquired in order to safely resume control and 
avoid potentially dangerous situations on the road 
(Damböck et al., 2013). The definition of Situation 
Awareness used in this research, and defined 
initially by Endsley (1988), is: “the perception of 
the elements in the environment within a volume of 
time and space, the comprehension of their 
meaning, and the projection of their status in the 
near future.” In short, SA can be divided into three 
levels (perception; comprehension and prediction), 
which allow humans to orient their decisions in a 
particular context and volume of time (Fig. 2). 
 
Figure 2. Endsley's model of SA. This is a synthesis of versions she has given in several sources, notably Endsley 
(1995) and Endsley et al. (2000), in Wickens (2008). 
  
The loss of Situation Awareness and its relation to 
being “out of the loop” have been declared by a 
number of studies on vehicle automation (Carsten et 
al., 2012; Ohn-Bar & Trivedi, 2016; Morando et al., 
2019), some of which have considered how these 
concepts are affected by drivers’ engagement in 
non-driving-related tasks. It is argued that upon a 
request to resume control from automation, drivers 
have to move their visual attention from the NDRT, 
to focus on other sources of information, related to 
the driving task, to acquire enough SA to take back 
control of the vehicle. Gartenberg et al. (2014) refer 
to this process (which is not only relevant to vehicle 
automation) as Situation Awareness Recovery or 
SAR. This is described as a visual scanning process 
with a considerable number of short fixations in 
different areas, with a significant lag of resumption  
 
in tasks, and a high probability of re-fixation to the 
same information source, more than once. Examples  
of such a process was observed in Louw et al. 
(2019), who reported in their driving simulator 
experiments that drivers who were engaged in a 
visual non-driving-related task during automation 
(assumed to induce an OotL state) had a more 
scattered gaze pattern after resumption of control 
from a silent automation failure, compared to those 
who were required to monitor the road environment 
during automation. 
One of the challenges for the human factors 
community in addressing this problem is that the 
process of SAR is accompanied by several barriers, 
called SA challenges (Endsley, 2006). Endsley & 
Kriss (1995) named several challenges for the 
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Situation Awareness acquisition, such as attention 
tunnelling, change blindness, stress on operators’ 
(drivers’) working memory, as well as the division 
of the information required from multiple sources, 
making it difficult for operators to gather all the 
information they might need in a reasonable amount 
of time (e.g. see Parasuraman & Riley, 1998). For 
driving automation, it has been demonstrated that 
time pressure, or information overload, might affect 
the quality of drivers’ performance. This is thought 
to be because drivers’ attentional resources are 
continuously stretched by the high demands of the 
driving task itself, which is aggravated by 
automation (Goodrich & Boer, 2003). The 
dispersion of drivers’ gaze also competes between 
focused attention to the vehicle’s heading (due to a 
visual-motor coordination, Wilkie et al., 2008) and 
hazard perception routines, which are generally 
characterised by an increased lateral gaze dispersion 
(Crundall et al., 1999). Therefore, drivers not only 
have to acquire information about the situation in 
the environment, and the current status of the 
system (an issue also reported by Endsley, 2006), 
but also have to recover their visual-motor 
coordination, which is degraded once you relinquish 
control from the vehicle (Mole et al., 2019).  Many 
empirical studies show that this need to disperse 
visual attention to different sources affects drivers’ 
performance, increasing risk of crashes (see Russel 
et al., 2016; Zeeb et al., 2015; Blommer et al., 2016; 
Louw et al., 2017; Merat et al., 2014; Gold et al., 
2013; Damböck et al., 2013).  
 
3. Decision-making theory principles and 
models 
 
The definition of decision-making adopted in this 
work was proposed by Edwards (1954), and is 
defined as follows: “(…)given two states, A and B, 
into either one of which an individual may put 
himself, the individual chooses A in preference to B 
(or vice versa)”.  This definition was further 
developed by Simon (1959), who added organised 
this process into four main stages: 1) definition of 
the problem, 2) identification of possible solutions, 
3) objective assessment of the value of each solution 
for the problem, 4) choice of the best solution. As 
human beings, we are continuously making 
decisions, based on our internal representation of 
what we should do in every situation, given certain 
parameters (stage 3). In a driving task, many actions 
involve a decision-making process. Some examples 
include deciding: a comfortable car-following 
distance (Boer, 1999), what gaps we will accept 
when changing lanes (Gipps, 1986), how we 
respond to a potential forward collision (Blommer et 
al., 2017), and whether to disengage from 
automation (see Markkula et al., 2018, for more 
examples). 
In the context of this paper, decision-making can be 
defined as the drivers’ choice to take-over control of 
the vehicle or not, and their take-over modality 
(how do they take-over). When constructing a 
model for such decision-making, to account for a 
good or bad decision, in terms of safety, we have as 
observable output variables the decision-making 
time (how long drivers took to decide to take-over), 
decision choice (how they reacted to the given 
scenario) and outcome (based on the objectives 
established for the given situation, were they able to 
achieve this goal?). Yet, there are several kinds of 
decision-making theory models, which may account 
for different aspects of human behaviour, and might 
be useful for certain situations and not others. 
Edwards (1954) also divided the decision-making 
theory models into two main spectrums, which their 
most recent and developed definitions shall be 
further explained in the later sections of this paper: 
the rational and risky decision-making models. 
 
3.1. Rational decision-making models 
 
The concept of rational decision-making (see Simon 
(1979) and March (1978) for a more descriptive 
definition of the term) is based on a metaphorical 
“thinking man”, as a decision-maker. According to 
Simon (1979) and March (1978), a thinking man 
can be characterized as an individual by two main 
conditions: 1) as being capable of acquiring and 
distinguishing all possible relevant information for 
the decision in hand; and 2) the thinking man is 
capable of assigning the correct value of a specific 
choice, based on their established goal in each 
decision-making scenario. Based on these 
assumptions, two individuals would always arrive at 
the same conclusion, when making a rational 
decision about the same problem. The only 
difference between their choices would be personal 
bias, or what outcome they want from the decision. 
Good examples of rational decision-making models 
can be seen in game theory (Nash, 1950), which 
posits that all choices made by an individual have a 
counterpart by a “hostile” opponent (like a chess 
game). The opponent will focus their actions on 
maximising their chances of achieving their goal, 
which is the opposite of the individual’s goal. 
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Another example of a rational decision can be seen 
in the utilitarianism theory, created by Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill in the early 19th 
century. This theory holds that there are “greater 
goods” in life, and every moral action can be 
quantified in terms the outcome of “happiness”, and 
that it is always right to maximise happiness in our 
choices in life for a “greater good” (for a more 
complete description of the term, see Mill, 1868). 
Indeed, rational decision-making processes are 
utopic in most cases, and their scope for 
applicability is limited, as everything needs to be 
quantifiable, such as in mathematical logic problem 
solutions (for examples, see Bell et al., 1988).  
 
3.2. Risky decision-making models 
 
According to decision-making theory, whenever the 
decision-maker is forced to make a decision without 
a clear notion of the possible outcomes of their 
choice, this process is considered to be a risky 
decision (Edwards, 1954). Models in the risky 
decision-making theory are based on the 
assumptions: 1) that not all variables can be 
accurately, or even wholly, quantified, 2) that 
humans are not certain about how their actions will 
affect the environment of the task in hand, and, 3) 
humans are not aware of are all the variables that 
they should consider to make their decision. 
Humans in that situation can estimate, based on 
their mental models (see Nielsen, 2010 for a 
description of the term), the probable outcomes for a 
given task for each possible action that they can 
perform, and use that information to guide their 
decision-making. In situations where the outcome of 
an individual’s decision is not predictable, they need 
to account for a level of uncertainty as part of their 
decision-making process. Uncertainty is defined by 
Shaw (1983) as the inability of the decision-making 
to assign the correct value of an option, nor predict 
the outcomes of their decision to the given 
environment. This uncertainty concept is a key 
assumption underlying risky decision-making 
models and is discussed later in this paper. As 
humans’ mental processing is not directly 
observable, risky decision-making models can be 
used to explain human behaviour based on certain 
assumptions. The most relevant ones are described 
below: 
Evidence accumulation models assume that every 
decision-maker a priori does not have sufficient 
information about the situation to make a decision 
and will seek evidence that will influence their 
decision towards one of the outcomes known to 
them. Furthermore, every individual has a personal 
threshold of accumulated evidence that once 
reached, causes them to opt for one possible choice, 
over another (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). This 
threshold varied based on a number of factors, 
including experience, gender, personal attitudes and 
many others. It must be noted that the rate of 
evidence, or “drift”, is accumulated differently for 
every person, which is also influenced by a number 
of factors. In the field of vehicle automation, 
Markkula et al. (2018) have demonstrated how to 
apply decision-making models based on evidence-
accumulation to explain, for example, what 
information drivers use to decide how to resume 
control from vehicle automation to avoid an 
incoming forward collision. 
Bounded rationality models, first defined by 
Simon (1972), which holds that humans can make 
decisions based on the information available to 
them. These have similar assumptions to rational 
decision-making models but differ in that they 
assume that humans are not capable of considering 
all the relevant information to make a decision. This 
can be caused by a lack of cognitive resources, time 
pressure, or simple lack of knowledge about the 
presence of a particular source of information. 
Considering this paradigm, bounded rationality 
models assume that the decision-maker prioritises 
certain information over others (randomly or 
selectively). This prioritised information will most 
likely bias the decision towards a particular choice, 
depending on the information sampled, and not only 
on individual preferences. This kind of model is 
especially relevant for the transition of control in 
vehicle automation, as it is assumed that drivers in 
such situations can be overloaded with large 
volumes of spatially dispersed visual information, 
and may not be able to process all the information 
they would need Examples for such overload can be 
found in Gold et al. (2013) and Blommer et al. 
(2017), who show that drivers change their 
decisions about when to resume control from 
automation, based on the amount of time they have 
to react before the automated system reaches its 
limit. Although, it is worth considering that those 
authors have only considered visual information, so 
other factors might also have affected the observed 
results. 
Satisficing decision-making models assume that 
the decision-maker will not seek the most optimal 
solution for his/her problem, but instead will make 
the first decision where the outcome satisfies their 
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needs or goals in the given situation (Wierzbicki, 
1982; Parke et al., 2007). This approach was used in 
studies by Boer (1999), Boer & Hoedemaeker 
(1998), and Goodrich & Boer (2003), in different 
scenarios. For example, Boer (1999) demonstrated 
that drivers tend to have not one specific “ideal car-
following distance”, but rather have a satisficing 
margin, that floats closer or further to the lead 
vehicle, where the drivers assume to be safe and 
close enough to be satisfied and refocus in other 
demands from the car-following task (such as lateral 
control of the vehicle), instead of actively re-adjust 
their following distance to a point they would 
consider to be ideal.  
 Most concepts in these models are somewhat 
interchangeable and can be combined in a 
descriptive or mechanistic analysis. Their 
relationship with the field of automation will be 
discussed in the subsequent sections of this work.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Relationship between human factors 
challenges and risky decision-making 
 
Based on the two types of decision-making theory 
models described above, it is evident that the 
process of Situation Awareness recovery during the 
transition control from vehicle automation presents 
several similarities to the risky decision-making 
theory, which is discussed in the following sections. 
Merat et al. (2018) stated that drivers re-enter the 
cognitive loop of the driving task by acquiring 
sufficient levels of Situation Awareness. In the same 
way, Ratcliff & Smith (2004) claim that whenever 
an individual is presented with an opportunity to 
make a decision, they will need to accumulate 
evidence that will support the choice they eventually 
make. This direct comparison shows similarities in 
the applicability of both the concept of evidence 
accumulation and SA for those theories with the 
same purpose, which is to understand how humans 
use the information to react to a given 
environmental condition and achieve their desired 
goal.  Fig. 2 presents a schematic representation of 
the proposed relationship between the two theories. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Representation of the relationship between SA and decision-making theory. 
 
 
As mentioned above, decision-making theory holds 
that the decision- making process is composed by 
four steps: 1) define the problem, and understand its 
characteristics; 2) formulate/generate possible 
solutions for the given problem; 3) estimation of the 
value of possible outcomes; 4) selection of the 
outcome with the highest value for the given 
problem (see Simon, 1959 for a better description). 
Endsley (1995) divided the SA into levels, in a way 
that the individual needs to 1) identify the elements 
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in the environment, 2) comprehend their meaning, 
and how it shapes the situation in hand, and 3) 
orient how those elements can be interacted with, in 
a way that is possible to predict what can be the 
outcomes of their potential actions. According to 
Simon (1957) and Edwards (1954), a decision can 
only be made if there is a clear notion/definition of 
the value of each solution to the upcoming problem, 
and that to achieve this, the decision-maker 
accumulates evidence that assigns the correct value 
to a particular option, reducing the decision-maker’s 
level of uncertainty (Shaw, 1982). Observing the 
same phenomenon through the lenses of the SA 
theory, we can understand that the comprehension 
of the problem (in the case of this work, a request to 
transition control) and their possible solutions as 
level two SA. The process of assigning value, or 
expected outcome of possible action in order to 
make the appropriate decision can be directly linked 
to the level three situation awareness, or projection 
of future states. In this framework, it can be 
assumed that the process of moving from level two 
to level three SA can be directly compared to the 
process of accumulation of evidence, which is 
simply the reduction of uncertainty about the 
outcomes of a possible action to a given scenario. 
The arguments presented in the previous section 
showed that barriers, called SA challenges (Endsley, 
2006), impede an individual’s ability to acquire all 
the sufficient levels of SA they need to make an 
optimal resumption of control from automation (see 
Parasuraman & Riley (1997) for an example of such 
phenomenon). Analysing the challenges imposed to 
an individual to resume control from automation 
through the lens of decision-making theory, a 
similar problem is reported by Edwards (1954) and 
Simon (1957) who say that an entirely rational 
decision is utopic. The authors believe that barriers 
imposed by the scenario, such as time pressure and 
bounded rationality, forces the human decision-
maker to deal with uncertainty, by making 
assumptions about certain conditions about the 
environment, based on their expectations, and, thus, 
adopting a risky decision. As examples relating to 
resumption of control from vehicle automation, 
Blommer et al. (2017) and Gold et al. (2013) 
showed that drivers have an increased probability to 
“just brake”, instead of both braking and steering, 
whenever they had limited time to respond to the 
scenario. The authors noted that the scenario 
exceeded drivers’ abilities to cope with the situation 
and to perform the ideal action. These two examples 
can be translated in the risky decision-making 
theory as satisficing decision-making actions, where 
even if it was not perfect, it was the best they could 
do with the information they had, opting to make a 
simple reaction to the scenario. 
Based on the arguments presented above, we believe 
that risky decision-making theory is a suitable 
candidate to model the process of the take-over of 
control from vehicle automation. The application of 
decision-making theory can complement the 
existing studies on the transition, as it can be used to 
understand the relationship between the information 
sampled by drivers and their subsequent behaviour. 
Practically speaking, this approach complements the 
current studies in the field by providing robust 
mathematical models that assign causality between 
evidence accumulation and decision (see Orquin & 
Loose, 2013), which are not commonly linked to the 
situation awareness theory. It is now essential to 
evaluate how this theory can be applied and 
implemented to better describe driver behaviour 
during transitions of control.  
 
5. Using decision-making models to orient 
drivers’ decision-making 
 
Sivak (1996) stated that vision is the most important 
of the five human senses for driving, but yet, it is 
not suited to dealing with multiple demands at the 
same time. For this reason, drivers need to prioritise 
certain visual information over others to perform a 
transition of control (for more details about this 
process, see Goodrich & Boer, 2003). 
 
According to Orquin & Loose (2013), visual 
attention and decision-making are tightly coupled, 
since a driver’s risky decision-making is 
continuously biased by whether or not they attended 
to relevant visual information available to them. In 
their literature review, the authors found a co-causal 
relationship between visual attendance to 
information and the occurrence of specific choices, 
in a discrete decision-making scenario. As part of a 
meta-analysis, the authors analysed several 
decision-making tasks that used eye-tracking data as 
a dependent variable. They concluded that an 
individual’s gaze fixation on certain essential 
information could predict their upcoming choice in 
a discrete scenario, suggesting that the selective 
attention of drivers may bias their decision-making. 
Such an approach may also be applied to analyse 
drivers’ response capabilities in a take-over 
scenario, once a take-over reaction is nothing more 
than a selective response to a particular scenario 
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condition.  
 
The arguments above support the possibility of 
modelling the relationship between different gaze 
allocation strategies and the probability of yielding 
specific responses to the take-over control scenario 
(based on the studies reported by Orquin & Loose, 
2013). This approach would inform system 
designers about which information should be 
scanned with higher priority, to yield a higher 
probability of safe and timely responses to different 
take-over scenarios. This information could be used 
to create HMIs that guide drivers towards making 
decisions that result in safe outcomes. For example, 
indicating where drivers should focus their attention 
on a successful transition of control could help 
avoid an impending collision, as suggested by Louw 
et al. (2017). 
 
6. Formulation of a take-over model 
 
In previous sections, it was discussed theoretically 
how evidence accumulation models can be applied 
to understand and predict drivers’ take-over 
behaviour. Evidence from previous literature 
suggests that inputs from eye movements to the 
models can create a robust way to understand 
drivers decision-making process. This section of the 
paper describes the process of formulation of a 
mathematical model that can be applied for data 
fitting suited for the process of transition of control 
in vehicle automation, based on the elements 
discussed above. 
 
According to Wagenmakers et al. (2008), evidence 
accumulation models use real data from experiments 
to estimate how the process of information 
acquisition for every individual participant leads to 
their decision. It receives as the input variable 
response times (t) and choice selection (p) of every 
individual, and based on the individual differences 
across data samples, they can draw assumptions 
based on probability distributions of how humans 
make decisions. According to the authors, and many 
others in the field (see Ratcliff et al., 2004 for a 
more descriptive explanation about evidence 
accumulation models), the main estimated 
parameters in this kind of model are:  
1. Mean drift rate (v), or how quickly evidence 
is accumulated towards the decision. 
2. Boundary limit for the decision (a), or how 
much evidence needs to be accumulated for 
a decision to be made. 
3. Previous knowledge or information that 
may speed up the decision process (z), also 
known as bias. 
4. Inter-participant variability (s), which 
assumes that different people have 
faster/slower processes of evidence 
accumulation. 
 
Fig. 4 shows how all those variables are fit together 
in a graphical representation of the model and how 
the parameters are estimated. It is now necessary to 
understand how the context of the transition of 
control and situation awareness acquisition can be 
translated in this kind of model, and also how data 
related to visual attention allocation can be used to 
generate more accurate descriptions of drivers’ 
decision-making behaviour. 
 
Figure 4. Graphical representation of an evidence accumulation model. Source: Ratcliff et al. (2004).
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As already said before, the process of situation 
awareness acquisition can be directly translated as 
the process of evidence accumulation, in a way that 
drivers have as their primary goal to safely recover 
manual control of a vehicle, and will sample 
information about the multiple options they have to 
do so, until they reach a point that they are confident 
enough about one specific option and engage in the 
task execution. As the situation awareness 
acquisition process is mainly defined as a visual task 
(Gartenberg et al., 2014), and the process of 
transition of control is mainly constrained by 
bounded rationality (for examples, see Endsley, 
2006), it is possible to assume that different gaze 
sample patterns would inherently bias the 
accumulation process, leading to both different 
response times, and probability of certain response 
to happen. With this argument in mind, it is then 
necessary to insert in the model a variable related to 
gaze allocation over time, which controls how much 
evidence can be accumulated over time, based in 
where the drivers are looking (drift rate). 
Since this paper describes only a proof of concept 
for the theory presented above, we opted to develop 
an adapted version of a linear ballistic accumulator 
model (LBA; Brown & Heathcote, 2008). This 
technique was chosen due to its simplified math 
(easy to explain) and low computational power 
requirements for its implementation. Future studies 
might want to consider more robust models, which 
also includes other explanatory variables (eg. drift-
diffusion models). The LBA model is an evidence-
based decision-making model, which assumes that 
the process of evidence accumulation related to one 
possible choice is independent of the other, in a way 
that two possible decision choices are calculated 
separatelly, as if they were diferent scenarios. The 
second assumption of the model is that there is no 
internal variability or noise in the process of 
evidence accumulation. For every sample, it 
generates a linear function between evidence and 
time.  The differences in the response profiles can 
be only observed by across-participants differences 
(Dokin et al., 2009). 
The flowchart below (Fig. 5) is the conceptual 
representation of the proposed model, where drivers, 
after receiving a take-over request, would gather 
visual information, in a goal-directed top-down 
approach, to accumulate evidence about a possible 
solution to the task. This evidence would be 
combined with their previous information about the 
situation (current SA levels) and their personal bias 
and would accumulate until it reaches a threshold of 
satisficing levels, triggering the execution of an 
action. In this scenario, different sources of visual 
information would lead to a different drift rate, 
causing variability in drivers’ take-over time. In this 
process, every possible decision is calculated and 
modelled separately. 
 
Figure 5. Graphical representation of an evidence accumulation model. Source: Ratcliff et al. (2004). 
In terms of calculation, the purposed formula 
assumes that take-over time (tot) is the sum of the 
total time drivers spent gazing towards the n 
different sources (i) of information. Also, the 
process of accumulation of evidence is defined as 
the sum of the time drivers spent looking at each 
information source (t_i), times a constant, which 
indicates the drift rate, related to each specific 
information source (v_i). See below the two 
equations that define the base formula of the model. 
1) 𝑇𝑜𝑇 =  ∑ 𝑡𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  
 
2) 𝑎 = 𝑧 + (∑ 𝑡𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ∗ 𝑣𝑖) ∗ 𝑠 
 
Equation 1. Formulation for the take-over decision-
making model. ToT is the take-over time; t is the time 
drivers spent gazing towards each information source i; z 
is drivers’ previous knowledge about the situation and 
personal bias; v is the drift rate for every information 
source; a is the estimated threshold for the decision-
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making, and s is the ratio for individual differences. 
Figure 6. Graphical representation of the output from the 
proposed model. 
With this approach, it is possible to estimate how 
valuable certain information source i is for the 
decision-making process, assuming that it would 
affect drivers’ decisions in the same way. As for the 
assumptions of the model, 1) it assumes that the 
process of information acquisition is constant and 
linear, and does not account for information 
saturation of one source, nor to noise on the process 
of information acquisition; 2) it assumes that every 
option is computed individually, and not in a 
conflicting way, as a drift-diffusion model would 
(Ratcliff et al., 2004); 3) it assumes that drivers are 
in time pressure, in a way that they would perform 
the decided action as soon as they decided what to 
do, as mind-wandering and non-decision-making 
related data would add noise to the model. 
7. Conclusion 
The primary aim of this paper was to assess the 
feasibility of applying risky decision-making theory 
models to understand drivers’ take-over behaviour 
during transitions of control from vehicle 
automation. A secondary aim was to explain how 
decision-making models could be implemented by 
system designers as a tool to understand human 
behaviour and create products that better suit driver 
needs. 
The initial sections point out similarities between the 
theories on SA and risky decision-making, which 
makes them comparable and applicable for similar 
purposes. The main points of proximity between the 
two theories include the concepts of evidence 
accumulation and level three situation awareness, 
respectively, to account for how humans make a 
decision in a given scenario. We also proposed that 
models that correlate vision and decision-making 
modality as a causal factor could be used to identify 
which information, once sampled, can increase the 
probability for drivers to perform a supposed 
“optimal response”. In conclusion, we propose that 
decision-making models, based on evidence 
accumulation, can be used in HMI design, to 
enhance drivers’ acquisition of certain essential 
information and, thereby, optimise their take-over 
performance. For example, if we know how drivers 
sample visual information before an optimal 
response, and we use this knowledge to design 
HMIs to reproduce this behaviour in other drivers in 
similar situations, then we may increase the 
probability that they respond similarly. 
As for limitations and future directions, this work is 
chiefly a theoretical consideration and lacks 
sufficient evidence to defend the real value of the 
application of decision-making models in the design 
process for human-centric vehicle automation 
systems. Empirical studies are required to evaluate 
how well decision-making models can predict 
drivers’ take-over modality, and whether, if certain 
information is highlighted in the system design, 
drivers’ performance in take-over scenarios can be 
enhanced. 
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